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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
This work assesses the impact of the Mutual Evaluation1 on Tanzania’s measures to combat 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism. It analyses the Mutual Evaluation Report 
(MER) on Tanzania following the evaluation conducted by the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)2 in 2009. The purpose of this study is to see to what 
extent Tanzania has, in the meantime, implemented the recommendations contained in the 
MER. Tanzania, like other countries worldwide, also faces the problem of money laundering. 
This has necessitated the government to enact laws and designate institutions for enforcing 
anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) measures.   
Money laundering is a process of hiding the true origin of illicit money so that a criminal can 
avoid punishment under the law and at the same time be able to reap benefits of their criminal 
activities.3 The problem of money laundering knows no borders as operatives of organised 
criminal syndicates crisscross the world employing the best technology and techniques at their 
disposal to elude law enforcement agents and thereby succeeding in making the proceeds of 
their illegal undertakings to look legal. With the globalisation of the world’s financial system, 
                                                     
1
 It is a monitoring programme designed to assess a country’s level of compliance with international standard for 
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. See ESAAMLG Mutual Evaluation Procedures 4. 
Available at http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/ESAAMLG%20ME%20Procedures%202009.pdf (accessed 26 April 
2013). 
2
 This is an Inter-governmental Organisation that was launched in 1999 in Tanzania for the task of combating 
money laundering. Its membership is voluntary and currently it has 16 members. Further information is available 
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/easternandsouthernafricaanti-moneylaunderinggroupesaamlg.html (accessed 
26 April 2013). 
3
 Levi M ‘Money Laundering and Its Regulation’ (2002) 582 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science. 
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countries have no choice but to pool their resources together and adopt a spirited universal 
preventive regime against money laundering activities.4 A unified global response to money 
laundering is of great necessity otherwise the weakest anti-money laundering jurisdiction could 
be utilised at the expense of the rest of the world.5  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is currently recognised as the global standard setter in 
the fight against money laundering.6 Its AML and CFT recommendations have been accepted 
and implemented in many countries. By the same token, with its comprehensive compliance 
monitoring process and the backing of the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund and powerful countries in the G8, the FATF has been able to 
influence many countries to implement its recommendations. Failure to adhere to the 40 
Recommendations7 has, in the past, led to countries being blacklisted as Non-Cooperative 
Countries or Territories (NCCTs). Such countries run the risk of being isolated from the world’s 
financial system which, in turn, impacts negatively to their economy.8   
By joining ESAAMLG, which is a FATF-Styled Regional Body (FSRB), Tanzania recognises that the 
crime of money laundering is sophisticated and transnational in nature, necessitating 
                                                     
4
 Michael Camdessus, a former Managing Director of the IMF on ‘Money Laundering: The Importance of 
International Countermeasures’ available at    http:// www.imf .org/ external /np / speeches /1998 / 021098.htm 
(Accessed 21 February 2013). 
5
 Blazejewski KS ‘The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the Effectiveness and Accountability of 
Transgovernmental Networks’ (2008) 22 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal. 
6
 Paton PD ‘Cooperation, Co-Option or Coercion? The FATF Lawyer Guidance and the Regulation of the Legal 
Profession’ (2010) Journal of the Professional Lawyer 169. 
7
 New 40 FATF Recommendations on AML/CFT were adopted in February 2012. Available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 18 September 
2013).  
8
 Beekary N ‘The International Anti-Money Laundering Law and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regulatory 
Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law’ (2011) Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business. 
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international co-operation in the fight against it. As per the Memorandum of Understanding, all 
ESAAMLG members have pledged to adopt and implement the FATF’s 40 Recommendations 
and to subject themselves to mutual evaluation. 9 According to its mandate, ESAAMLG acts as a 
regional enforcer of AML measures by conducting periodic studies on money laundering 
typologies and mutual evaluations on countries’ levels of implementation of FATF 
Recommendations which are widely regarded as international standard in combating money 
laundering and terrorist financing. 
In the mid 1980s, during the period of economic liberalisation, Tanzania experienced an 
upsurge in economic criminality such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, corruption, fiscal 
offences, fraud, and poaching.10 Today, predicate offences (i.e. offences that give rise to money 
laundering, e.g. theft, fraud, and illegal poaching) for money laundering are almost the same as 
they were in the 1980s although they vary as regards gravity and the motives and methods of 
commission. Being a largely cash-based economy, the country is more prone to money 
laundering because it is easier to integrate illicit profits into the economy without necessarily 
involving financial institutions.11 
                                                     
9
 Article II (3) and III (2) of the MOU available at 
http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/ESAAMLG_MOU_INCORPORATING_MAURITIUS_AMENDMENTS_SEPTMBER_20
11(1).pdf (accessed 26 April 2013). 
10
 Mwema SA ‘Current Situation and Counter Measures against Money Laundering: Tanzania’s Experience’ 
available at http:// www. unafei. or.jp/ english/ pdf/RS_No58/No58_36PA_Mwema.pdf (Accessed 21 February 
2013). 
11
 Moshi H ‘Implications of Cash Dominated Transactions for Money Laundering’ (2012) Institute for Security 
Studies .Available at http://www.issafrica.org/publications/situation-reports/implications-of-cash-dominated-
transactions-for-money-laundering (accessed 21 February 2013). 
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The government of Tanzania, realising the serious threats posed by money laundering to 
national economic development,12 has taken the following measures: first, it has ratified the 
International Conventions relevant to the fight against money laundering and terrorist 
financing13; and secondly, it has criminalised money laundering and terrorist financing and set 
up regulatory institutions for enforcement of various AML/CFT measures.14 It has also 
continued to participate in ESAAMLG activities.  
In 2009, ESAAMLG conducted a mutual evaluation of Tanzania in line with the procedures 
adopted and approved by the ESAAMLG Council of Ministers in Lesotho in 2009. The aim of the 
evaluation was to assess Tanzania’s level of compliance with international AML and CFT 
standards as set out in the FATF 40 Recommendations. Therefore, the evaluation was based on 
the FATF Recommendations as well as on the laws and regulations of Tanzania.15 Subsequently, 
it issued a report detailing the findings of the evaluation exercise.  
The report identified various weaknesses in the law,16 some of which concerned the fact that 
the definition of a predicate offence under the AML Act did not include all the categories of 
designated offences as listed by the FATF, and that predicate offences for money laundering did 
                                                     
12
 Tanzania National Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Strategy (the National 
AML/CFT Strategy) 6. Available at http://www. esaamlg. org/ userfiles / 
NATIONAL_AML_STRATEGY_TANZANIA.pdf (accessed 21 February 2013). 
13
 The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna 
Convention of 1988) was ratified in 1996; The International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism was ratified in 2003. Also, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the 
Palermo Convention of 2000) was ratified in 2005.  
14
 The Anti-Money Laundering Act No.12 (the AML Act) of 2006. Available at 
http://polis.parliament.go.tz/PAMS/docs/12-2006.pdf (accessed 22 February 2013). Likewise, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act No.21 of 2002 criminalises terrorism and terrorist financing. 
15
 Tanzania MER 11. Available at 
http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Tanzania_Mutual_Evaluation_Detail_Report.pdf (accessed 22 February 2013). 
16
 MER 229ff. 
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not cover conduct that took place in another jurisdiction. Furthermore, according to Tanzania’s 
law, there had to be a conviction for a predicate offence when proving that property 
constitutes the proceeds of illicit activities. 
This study stems from the assumption that mutual evaluation is the best compliance 
monitoring mechanism for implementing the FATF Recommendations at the domestic level. 
The evaluation exercise reveals a country’s compliance status. If a country is found to be non-
compliant with certain aspects then it faces pressure from other countries to rectify the 
deficiencies.17 This has led to most countries adopting national strategies for remedying 
deficiencies identified in the respective MERs. ESAAMLG usually undertakes post-evaluation 
follow ups to ensure that the evaluated country complies with the FATF Recommendations.18 A 
country can be subjected to rigorous compliance procedures, the worst of which is suspension 
from ESAAMLG until it complies with membership requirements.19 
In 2010 the government of Tanzania adopted the National Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism Strategy (July 2010 – June 2013) in response to the issues 
raised in the MER.20 For example, on the objective of “Implementation of Anti-Money 
Laundering and Prevention of Terrorism Legislation”, one of the strategies is to “strengthen and 
                                                     
17
 In 2012, Tanzania was labelled a ‘Non-Compliant Jurisdiction’ by the FATF for not implementing some FATF 
Recommendations. This made some countries like the UK to issue a warning about financial dealings with 
Tanzania. This is the kind of pressure that coerces countries to implement the FATF Recommendations. The risk of 
non-compliance is isolation from the world’s financial system. See ‘Advisory Notice on Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing Controls in Overseas Jurisdictions’ issued by the UK Treasury available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/advisory_notice_moneylaundering_nov2012.pdf (accessed 30 April 2013). 
18
 Article IV of ESAAMLG Mutual Evaluation Procedures (MEP). 
19
 Article IV paragraph 70 of ESAAMLG MEP. 
20
 The National AML/CFT Strategy 21. 
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refine the AML/CFT regulatory framework” which would be achieved by, among other things, 
amending the AML/CFT law so as to incorporate the Recommendations of the MER.  
Sticking to the action plan under the National AML/CFT Strategy,21 in 2012 the Parliament of 
Tanzania amended the AML Act with the Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act.22 This law 
introduces changes which are based on the recommendations contained in the MER. Some of 
the amendments include making the AML Act applicable to Zanzibar in respect of Part II which 
relates to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and National Multidisciplinary Committee on 
Anti-money laundering,23 and increasing the number of regulators for AML measures.24  
Despite such amendments which were aimed at removing weaknesses in the AML Act, the FATF 
has nevertheless identified flaws in the Tanzanian AML/CFT legal framework. The FATF’s 
criticism was principally directed at the fact that, despite earnest endeavours to remedy the 
flawed legislation, Tanzania has failed to implement its action plan within the agreed 
timelines.25 Also, there was still a need to clarify what predicate offences are and to devise 
concrete and enforceable asset-freezing procedures for terrorist assets.  
The significance of this work lies in the fact that there is no scholarly literature on Tanzania’s 
legal regime for AML and CFT. This study evaluates the current AML/CFT law in Tanzania and 
exposes legal and other impediments to an effective AML/CFT regime. That would be useful for 
                                                     
21
 Action Plan C under the National AML/CFT Strategy 22. 
22
 Act No.01 of 2012 available at http://polis.parliament.go.tz/PAMS/docs/1-2012.pdf (Accessed 22 February 
2013). 
23
 Section 2 of the AML (Amendments) Act. 
24
 Section 3(b) of the AML (Amendments) Act. 
25
 FATF Public Statement available at http:// www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions 
/documents/ fatfpublicstatement-19october2012.html#Tanzania (Accessed 22 February 2013). 
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policy decisions in the government and the ESAAMLG. Likewise, based on the mistakes that 
Tanzania made in implementing the FATF’s Recommendations, this research paper serves as an 
important guide for many other countries especially in the developing world on how to, or how 
not to, go about devising and enacting an AML/CFT legal regime. The Tanzanian experience 
could help other countries that do not have AML/CFT laws to save time and expense in creating 
effective measures against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  
1.2  Research Question 
This research work is guided by two research questions namely: What is the significance of the 
mutual evaluation exercise in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing? Is 
Tanzania’s legislative and institutional capacity good enough for combating money laundering 
and terrorist financing effectively?    
1.3 Answer to the Problem 
This study addresses the problem by looking at the status of implementation of the FATF 40 
Recommendations in Tanzania. It focuses on the implementation of the National AML/CFT 
Strategy, which is a direct response to the ESAAMLG’s MER. At the time of writing, the strategy 
has not been fully implemented. There are a number of action plans under the strategy that 
have not been implemented thus far. For example, there are law “enforcement objectives”26 
that have not been fulfilled including: establishing a financial intelligence database; 
strengthening investigation capacity through the use of modern tools; and the use of modern 
surveillance equipment at border crossings for detecting movements of cash, just to name a 
                                                     
26
 National AML/CFT Strategy 33 – 34. 
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few. On the legal objectives, one significant step is the enactment of the amendments in 2012. 
The legislative amendments have significantly strengthened the AML/CFT regime. However, 
there are some gaps that still exist in the AML/CFT laws as discussed in chapter 4. For a robust 
AML/CFT system, Tanzania needs to amend the laws so as to remove the gaps and to 
strengthen the enforcement capacity of its institutions. For example, there is a need to ensure 
independence of the FIU as well as strengthening its capacity to enable it to carry out its 
mandate under the law effectively. At the time of writing, the FIU is a ministerial department 
under the Ministry of Finance. This breeds conflict of interests which could derail its efforts to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing.    
1.4 Literature Survey 
There is dearth of scholarly literature on Tanzania regarding money laundering and terrorist 
financing. There is a chapter in a monograph by Eugene Mniwasa.27 He defines the offence of 
money laundering from the point of view of international law. He further explains predicate 
offences for money laundering in Tanzania as well as the legal and institutional framework for 
combating money laundering. He also discusses obstacles to a successful anti-money laundering 
regime in Tanzania and offers recommendations on what should be done to address the 
impediments. However, his work gives only a general picture of the problem. It does not give a 
detailed discussion of specific legal issues relevant to AML and CFT. Furthermore, his analysis of 
the law is based on the AML legal framework under the Proceeds of Crime Act28 as opposed to 
                                                     
27
 Mniwasa EE ‘Detection and Suppression of Money Laundering in Tanzania’ (2004) 2 in monograph 108 ‘Tackling 
Money Laundering in East and Southern Africa – An Overview of Capacity’ Institute for Security Studies. Available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono108.pdf (accessed 29 April 2013). 
28
 Act No.25 of 1991 available at http://polis.parliament.go.tz/PAMS/docs/25-1991.pdf (accessed 29 April 2013). 
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the current regime under the AML Act of 2006, as amended in 2012. This study broadens the 
discussion on AML/CFT measures in Tanzania by evaluating the existing AML/CFT laws against 
international standards.    
Prince Bagenda has also written on the problem of money laundering in Tanzania.29 He gives a 
good summary of the sources of illicit money in Tanzania and the laws proscribing money 
laundering. However, his work lacks legal substance as it only mentions the laws without giving 
a concrete analysis of the AML regime. He also does not discuss Tanzania’s current AML/CFT 
legal regime.  
1.5 Structure of the Paper 
This paper consists of the following chapters: 
Chapter One 
This chapter outlines the research proposal. 
Chapter Two 
It provides information relating to organised criminality in Tanzania. Major predicate crimes for 
money laundering in Tanzania are discussed here.   
 
 
                                                     
29
 Bagenda PM ‘Combating Money Laundering in the SADC Sub-Region: The Case of Tanzania’ (2003) in monograph 
90 ‘Profiling Money Laundering in Eastern and Southern Africa’ Institute for Security Studies. Available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono90.pdf (accessed 29 April 2013). 
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Chapter Three 
It deals with the role of the mutual evaluation exercise in the implementation of international 
AML/CFT standards. It also provides a summary of international law on AML/CFT. The 
ESAAMLG’s mutual evaluation of Tanzania is also discussed here. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter studies Tanzania’s current AML/CFT legal regime and critiques the pertinent 
provisions of the law insofar as they relate to international AML/CFT standards.  
Chapter Five 
It concludes the work. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This study is a desktop activity which draws on both primary and secondary sources available 
electronically and in hard print. The latter comprises mainly books, chapters in books, journal 
articles, notes, internet reports and press statements. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A SURVEY OF ORGANISED CRIMINALITY IN TANZANIA 
2.1 Introduction 
There is an acute scarcity of literature on organised crime in Tanzania. However, this chapter 
tries to provide facts on organised criminal activities in Tanzania. It shows how political and 
socio-economic changes have led to the rise of organised crime in modern Tanzania. It also 
provides an account of incidents of organised crime that have been reported in official reports 
and the media. Finally, in the course of discussing such incidents, this author describes the 
present laws for curbing specific forms of organised crime. 
2.2 The Historical Account of Organised Crime in Tanzania 
The emergence of modern organised crime in Tanzania is closely linked to economic reforms 
that were implemented in the 1980s. In 1967, Tanzania introduced socialism as an official state 
policy. This was done through the Arusha Declaration of 1967.30 The declaration proclaimed the 
policy of socialism and self-reliance.31 The policy resulted into the establishment of a command 
economy in Tanzania, according to which the State controlled and owned the major means of 
production. The private sector was stifled to make way for nationalisation and the public 
ownership of key resources.32 The implementation of socialism was not a smooth ride for the 
government. In early 1970s Tanzania plunged into economic difficulties which would later lead 
to a realignment of the economic policies towards an open market economy. The country 
                                                     
30
 Arusha Declaration available at http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere/1967/arusha-declaration.htm 
(accessed 24 July 2013). 
31
 O’ Neill N and Mustafa K (eds) Capitalism, Socialism and the Development Crisis in Tanzania (1990) 13. 
32
 Kahama GC, Maliyamkono TL, & Wells S The Challenge for Tanzania’s Economy (1986) 31 – 39. 
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experienced severe droughts which crippled agricultural output. This resulted in an acute 
shortage of food in the country with huge amounts having to be imported from elsewhere.33 
Due to a balance of payments crisis in 1979, Tanzania ran short of foreign currency and this 
curtailed the government’s purchasing power to import goods.34 The manufacturing sector also 
declined sharply due to a shortage of infrastructure and fuel. This situation led to an 
unprecedented shortage of consumer goods in Tanzania.35 
This development marked the beginning of organised criminality in Tanzania in early 1980s. 
Criminal gangs colluded to hoard goods, especially food products, and to sell them on the black 
market at prices higher than the ones set by the state. At the time, trade was strictly regulated 
by the government. In 1983, the government vowed to fight what they called walanguzi 
(Swahili for black market operatives). The then Minister for Trade ordered all industries to sell 
their commodities to state-regulated trading companies, and violators of this order were 
subjected to criminal sanctions.36 Despite a warning by the government, hoarding and illegal 
manipulation of market prices continued to hurt the economy. Criminal gangs continued to 
flourish in the country by illegally obtaining industrial products and selling them to the needy at 
exorbitant prices. The government deemed this as economic sabotage. As a result, in 1983, 
special legal measures were adopted to deal with economic saboteurs.37 
                                                     
33
 Kahama, Maliyamkono, & Wells (1986) 41. 
34
 O’ Neill and Mustafa (1990) 246. 
35
 O’ Neill and Mustafa (1990) 247. 
36
 Bryceson D Liberalising Tanzania’s Food Trade: The Public and Private Faces of Urban Marketing Policy (1993) 24. 
37
 Carter RJ ‘Economic Sabotage Law’ (1983) Tanzanian Affairs. Available at 
http://www.tzaffairs.org/1983/07/economic-sabotage-law/ (accessed 24 July 2013). 
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The Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act was enacted in 1983. This law set up special 
anti-economic sabotage tribunals to try perpetrators of economic crimes, such as hoarding of 
goods and money. In no time, thousands of economic saboteurs were arrested and charged 
under the Economic Sabotage Law.38 In addition, hundreds were arrested and detained without 
trial under the Preventive Detention Act39 which authorised the President to detain without 
trial any person considered “dangerous to the peace and good order in any part of 
Tanganyika”.40 Some of the detainees were tried by anti-economic sabotage tribunals while 
others were released without being tried. The tribunal’s bench was constituted by a judge and 
lay people appointed by the President. The accused persons had neither right to bail nor to 
legal representation. Furthermore, the tribunals dispensed with the procedural safeguards 
ordinarily available in regular courts.41 These violations of human rights were highly criticised by 
the legal fraternity and human rights activists. The tribunals were also deemed to be a 
manifestation of the government’s mistrust of the judiciary in the adjudication of such cases.42  
In 1984, the Economic Sabotage Law was substituted with the Economic and Organised Crime 
Control Act.43 The law vests the High Court with jurisdiction to hear and decide cases 
constituting economic crimes.44 When hearing such cases, the High Court becomes an 
                                                     
38
 Bryceson (1993) 25. 
39
 Act No.60 of 1962. 
40
 Maina CP ‘Tanzania’ in Harding A and Hatchard J (eds) Preventive Dentention and Security Law: A Comparative 
Survey (1993) 247 – 258. 
41
 The Criminal Procedure Act as well as the Evidence Act was inapplicable to economic sabotage cases. 
42
 Peter CM ‘Independence of the Judiciary in Tanzania: Many Rivers to Cross’ Kituo cha Katiba 11. Available at 
http://www.kituochakatiba.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=365 (accessed 24 July 
2013). 
43
 Chapter 200 of the Laws of Tanzania. 
44
 Section 3(1) of the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act. 
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economic crimes court.45 The court is mandated to inquire into economic offences and to make 
a determination according to the law.46  A trial would not commence unless the Director of 
Public Prosecutions has consented to prosecution.47 Unlike the previous law as described 
above, investigations, trial and the conduct of proceedings are required to be conducted, unless 
the law prescribes otherwise, according to the Criminal Procedure Act and the Evidence Act.48 
The right to bail49 and the right of appeal50 are guaranteed. The law lists economic offences, 
which include:51  
 Hoarding of commodities. This offence covers numerous scenarios .For example, it is an 
offence where a person hoards consumer goods not for commercial purposes but solely 
for creating an artificial scarcity in the supply of such goods and sells them at higher 
prices or in an unlawful way; 
 Leading organised crime. The law makes it an offence for a person to intentionally 
organise and or finance a criminal racket52 for the purposes of committing economic 
crimes; 
 Possession of goods suspected of having being stolen or unlawfully acquired; 
                                                     
45
 Section 3(2). 
46
 Section 11. 
47
 Section 26. 
48
 Section 20, 28, and 46. 
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 Section 36. 
50
 Section 62. 
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 Section 57(1). 
52
 Section 2 defines a criminal racket as “any combination of persons or enterprises engaging, or having the 
purpose of engaging, whether once, occasionally or on a continuing basis, in conduct which amounts to an 
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 Unlawful sale of goods. Under the Trade Regulation Act of 1980, a Minister may 
designate goods which are to be sold only by certain authorised traders. Any non-
authorised trader who sells such goods breaks the law; 
 Authorisation of supply of designated goods to a person who is not an authorised trade 
for the purpose of resale; 
 Negligently or wilfully occasioning damage to property or pecuniary loss to a specified 
authority; 
  Interfering with a necessary service to the public;  
 Being unlawfully in the possession of arms. 
There are no official statistics on economic crime cases that have been brought before the 
Tanzanian courts so far. It is therefore difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the law in taming 
organised crime. However, there is one recent high profile case involving a former Tanzanian 
Ambassador to Italy. This is the case of R v Ricky Costa Mahalu and Grace Martin53 which was 
decided by the Resident Magistrates’ Court of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu. The accused persons 
were charged with conspiracy,54 use of erroneous documents to mislead the principal, 
stealing,55 and occasioning pecuniary loss to a specified authority.56 Briefly, the facts are as 
follows: 
 In 2002 the government of Tanzania needed to purchase a building in Rome, Italy, for its 
diplomatic mission. The then Ambassador, the first accused person, got permission from the 
                                                     
53
 Unreported Economic Criminal Case No.1 of 2007. It is available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/104776274/Hukumu-Mahalu (accessed 8 August 2013). 
54
 Contrary to section 384 of the Penal Code.  
55
 Contrary to section 265 and 270 of the Penal Code. 
56
 Contrary to section 57(1) and 60 as well as Para 10 of the First Schedule to the Economic and Organised Crime 
Control Act. 
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government to find a suitable building. The Ambassador, on behalf of the government, agreed 
to purchase a house owned by an Italian company, CERES S.R.L, at a price of € 3,098,741.40. 
The deal was sanctioned by the government. The purchase price was paid under two different 
contracts in two instalments, all making up the total agreed price. The first notarised contract 
showed that the purchase price was € 1,032,913.80. This amount was duly paid into account 
number 2182/51 SWIFT Code: BROMITRDNOR of Rome, Italy. The remaining amount of € 
2,065,827.60 was paid into account number 106705 SWIFFT Code: CFMOMCMX of Monaco. 
This was made under the second unnotarised contract. The two payments were effected on 24 
September 2002 through a bank called Direzione Territoriale Italia Centrale. 
The thrust of the prosecution’s case was that the accused persons conspired to steal public 
funds and thereby occasioned monetary loss to the government of Tanzania by using 
fraudulent documents to misstate the purchase price so that they siphon off the balance. Their 
investigation concluded that the purchase price was € 1,032,913.80 and not € 3,098,741.40 as 
communicated to the government by the Ambassador. They had thus colluded and succeeded 
to steal the balance of   € 2,065,827.60. To support their case, the prosecution argued that the 
accused had circumvented public procurement procedures and the use of the two contracts 
was a scheme for swindling the money. The defence denied any wrongdoing by asserting that 
they adhered to the law and that the government had duly approved the deal. They further 
contended that the use of two contracts for purchasing real property as such is a common 
practice in Italy and that the seller wanted two payment contracts, to which government 
agreed. 
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The court acquitted the accused on all charges. The prosecution’s evidence was dismissed as 
being too circumstantial and theoretical. It stated that the accused Ambassador was duly 
authorised by the government to purchase the house in the manner it was done. As for two 
separate payments, the court said that the use of two contracts is not criminal under the law 
and that the charge of stealing could not stand since the money was paid into the vendor’s 
accounts and there had been no evidence showing that the accused had withdrawn the money 
afterwards. Critical to the judgment is the admission by the court that the two contracts could 
have been used by the Italian vendor for evading tax. It further stated that this was a matter of 
concern only to the Italian government. The prosecution have appealed in the High Court, and 
at the time of writing, the appeal is still pending. 
Most of the criticism is levelled at the court’s comments that the two contracts were ideal for 
tax evasion but the Tanzanian government should not be concerned with that, only the Italians. 
This was a grave error.  According to Italian law, transfer of ownership of real estate by way of 
sale is taxable. The amount of tax is based on the purchase price stated in a notarised contract 
which legally transfers ownership to the buyer.57 This means that Italy earned tax only on the 
purchase price stated under the first notarised contract. No tax was gained from € 2,065,827.60 
paid under the second under-the-table contract. This whole scheme amounts to two indictable 
crimes under Italian law. Incorrect statement of the sale price could constitute charges of tax 
evasion and falsified sale agreement.58  Although tax evasion was not an issue in the case, it is 
an offence in Tanzania and should not be condoned by a court of law, even if committed 
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 Kalin CH International Real Estate Handbook (2005) 405 and 414.     
58
 Kalin (2005) 417. 
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abroad. The deal involved the government of Tanzania and, therefore, by agreeing to the two 
contracts, the Ambassador knowingly helped the Italian vendor to evade tax. It would be 
possible for the Ambassador to be prosecuted in Italy, if the sending state lifts diplomatic 
immunity, 59  for complicity in tax evasion. This has not happened thus far. 
This case underscores some of the critical weaknesses in Tanzania’s justice system. The 
judgment indicates that the prosecutor and investigators did not follow the money but the 
person. The evidentiary gaps in the prosecution’s case indicate that they are not well versed to 
deal with white collar organised criminality. This was possibly a case of tax evasion and money 
laundering. They did not bother to follow the money that was paid into an account in Monaco 
to try and trace the route which the money might have taken from there. This could have 
possibly provided a clue as to how the Government was swindled. Monaco is a tax haven 
known for money laundering. Circumstantial evidence produced in court suggests surreptitious 
and dirty conduct on the part of the accused, but this was not enough to secure a conviction.  
As for the law, there are serious gaps in the Economic and Organised Crime Act. The law lacks a 
transnational dimension as envisaged under the Palermo Convention.60 Likewise, the offences 
listed in the law do not include serious crimes like corruption, money laundering, tax evasion, 
human trafficking, drug trafficking and terrorism. Another shortcoming is the lack of a provision 
for protection of property belonging to bona fide third parties during confiscation.61 It is 
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 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.  
60
 Kenya’s Prevention of Organised Crime Act No.6 of 2010 is a good example. The law mirrors the Palermo 
Convention and covers all serious crimes. Available at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/Prevention_of_Organised_Crimes_Act__No._6_of_20
10.pdf (accessed 8 August 2013).     
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 Section 45 of the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act allows confiscation. 
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submitted that there could be some historical and political reasons for such weaknesses. The 
1984 Anti-Organised Crime Law was specifically enacted for controlling trade in consumer 
products and dealing with economic sabotage. At the time of its enactment, the country was 
facing an acute shortage of goods and increasing activities of economic saboteurs. There was a 
need to stop hoarding of goods and black market transactions, as stated above. This scenario is 
aptly explained by the list of offences covered under the law. The section below discusses the 
factors that make Tanzania vulnerable to organised crime. 
2.3  Tanzania’s Vulnerability to Organised Crime and Money Laundering 
Tanzania is vulnerable to organised crime and money laundering for the following reasons: 
 Strategic border crossings are not well monitored. Tanzania shares borders with eight 
countries, namely Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). See the map below. 
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Official Map of Tanzania.62 
It has a total of 43 official inland border crossings.63 Only seven entry points are manned by 
immigration officials in twenty four hours. The rest (36) have such services from 6.00hrs to 
18.30hrs. Most border posts lack sufficient human and law enforcement resources, making 
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 Available at http://www.ardhi.go.tz/sites/default/files/TANZANIA_0.pdf (accessed 8 August 2013). 
63
 Immigration Entry Points, available at http://immigration.go.tz/module1.php?id=37 (accessed 8 August 2013). 
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them porous and vulnerable to perpetrators of organised crime. Porous country borders have 
been cited for increasing drug trafficking activities64 as well as human trafficking in Tanzania.65 
 Tanzania has an Indian Ocean coastline of 1424 kilometres66 and three major ports.67 
There are also six smaller ports.68 These ports have been used by criminals as a conduit 
for drug trafficking.69 
 Law enforcement officials are poorly versed in information communication technology 
(ICT).70 This lack of skill impedes their ability to fight cybercrime. There is evidence of an 
upsurge of ICT-related crimes in recent years71 with the result that the police have been 
compelled to set up a unit to deal with cybercrime. Anecdotal information indicates 
that the unit is understaffed and not well equipped to deal with e-organised crime in 
the cyberspace.  
 Tanzania’s economy is cash-based as most transactions are concluded in cash. Financial 
Institutions operate only in major cities and towns, with most of the rural population 
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 Tanzania Foreign Policy and Government Guide (2011 Volume 1), Strategic Information and Developments 18, 
International Business Publications USA. 
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 Kenya and Tanzania in Human Trafficking Web, available at 
http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2011/may/18864/kenya_and_tanzania_in_human_trafficking_web.aspx 
(accessed 8 August 2013). 
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Confrece (accessed 8 August 2013). 
71
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having no access to banks.72 This situation suits organised crime as criminals launder 
money by splashing out cash for luxurious goods such as posh cars and luxurious flats. 
There is no limit on cash transactions. Tracing and investigating cash-based transactions 
for money laundering is difficult because they do not involve banks. Were the banks to 
be involved, this would ease investigations since banks are required to conduct due 
diligence audits and to report suspicious transactions.  
 Cellphone electronic financial transactions present new challenges. The majority of 
Tanzanians have resorted to mobile electronic financial services. A sizeable section of 
the population uses mobile phone operators to transfer money and to effect financial 
transactions.73 There are currently six mobile phone operators74 with a total of 
27,428,903 million subscribers.75 Recently, Vodacom is reported to have made a 
monthly turnover of $ 823.3 million in mobile cash transactions.76 Mobile electronic 
financial service works for both lawful and unlawful activities. For criminals, mobile 
money enables them to integrate illicit profits into the legal economy. The integration 
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 ‘Tanzania Banking Sector Performance Review ended 31 December 2011’ available at http: // monfinance. 
files.wordpress.com/2012/07/2011-tanzania-banking-sector-performance-review-final.pdf (accessed 15 July 2013). 
73
 ‘Mobile Phone Transfers grow fast’ available at http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/biz/10556-mobile-phone-
money-transfers-grow-fast (accessed 23 July 2013). See also a report on mobile money in Tanzania available at 
http://www.intermedia.org/wp-content/uploads/FITS_Tanzania_FullReport_final.pdf (accessed on 23 July 2013). 
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 Vodacom, Tigo, Airtel, Zantel, TTCL, and Benson. Statistics available at 
http://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/telecommunication/telecomStatsJune13.pdf (accessed 18 October 
2013). 
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 TCRA Quarter Telecom Statistics (March 2013) available at 
http://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/telecommunication/telecomStatsMarch13.pdf (accessed 8 August 
2013). 
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 ‘Vodacom Tanzania reports five million M-PESA subs; transactions top USD823m’ available at 
http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2013/05/02/vodacom-tanzania-reports-five-
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takes place quietly and smoothly as telecom operators have yet to implement anti-
money laundering measures. 
 Business transactions are poorly documented. Most retail businesses in Tanzania 
conduct transactions without giving receipts to customers. Purchases worth billions of 
shillings countrywide are not documented. This creates a benign environment for 
money launderers.    
Against this brief background, let us now look at the most prevalent forms of organised crime in 
Tanzania. 
2.4 Incidents of Organised Criminality in Modern Tanzania 
As stated earlier, Tanzania embarked on a programme of economic restructuring in the mid-
1980s. At the time, the country had experienced economic difficulties such as food insecurity, 
inability to import consumer products due to dwindling foreign currency reserves, an energy 
crisis, and an underperforming manufacturing sector. These problems forced the government 
to scrap the socialist system in favour of agreeing to be rescued by the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. This rescue package came with strings attached, which meant that 
the government was required to structure its economy in such a way that it shifted from a 
consumption-based economy to an investment-based economy. In 1986, the government 
accepted and implemented an economic recovery programme which, in effect, introduced the 
open market economy into Tanzania.77 This led to price deregulation, public sector reforms, 
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private sector empowerment, removal of import restrictions and trade barriers, promotion of 
investor friendly policies, and privatisation of public institutions. 
The introduction of a free market economy spawned the growth of organised crime in modern 
Tanzania. The radical economic changes opened up the economy to ordinary people, private 
entities and international actors. This development worked for both legal and illegal operators 
in the economy at the level of both the national and global economy, thus contributing to the 
growth of transnational organised crime.78 It was from the mid 1980s that Tanzania really 
started to experience forms of organised crime such as poaching, corruption, tax evasion, 
armed robbery, trade in narcotics, and smuggling of goods. Today, profit-generating crimes 
have remained the same as in the 1980s. A recent report lists theft, robbery, corruption, the 
smuggling of precious stones and metals, as well as drug trafficking, as major profit-generating 
crimes for money laundering in Tanzania.79  
2.4.1  Drug Trafficking 
Illegal dealing in narcotics is one of the most profitable crimes in the world.80 Drug trafficking is 
a highly lucrative business that produces profits which require laundering. In the illicit drug 
trade, Tanzania has been categorised as a destination and transit country.81 The most prevalent 
                                                                                                                                                                           
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1993/10/01/000009265_3961005101627/Rende
red/PDF/multi0page.pdf (accessed 28 July 2013). 
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 Mwema (2000). 
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 Mutual Evaluation Report 14. 
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 ESAAMLG ‘Laundering the proceeds of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances’ (2011) 6. 
Available at http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/DRUG-TRAFFICKING-REPORT.pdf (accessed 28 July 2013).  
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 ‘Organised Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa’, UNODOC Discussion Paper (2009) 29. Available at 
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drug trade and abuse in Tanzania involves cannabis.82 People in most regions of Tanzania 
cultivate cannabis for food and trade.83 The drug trade is still on the rise and this has impacted 
negatively on the economy. The increase in the illegal narcotics trade is attributable to porous 
country borders, corruption, a weak criminal justice system, poverty, illiteracy, lack of modern 
law enforcement techniques, just to name a few.84 In 2012, the police impounded 55 499 kg of 
illegal drugs and a total of 6 933 individuals were arrested.85 In January 2012, the police seized 
210 kg of heroin, the largest haul in Tanzania’s history, in the Lindi region.86 There are also 
reported incidents where Tanzanians have been used as couriers of illicit narcotics. Recently, 
two Tanzanian women were arrested at Oliver Tambo International Airport in South Africa with 
150 kg of illicit drugs called crystal methamphetamine, worth ZAR 42.6 million.87 In another 
incident, a Tanzanian woman was recently arrested at Harare International Airport with 15 kg 
of ephedrine.88 The woman was arriving from India, a country known for illicit drug trade. 
These facts reveal that drug trafficking is a huge transnational problem for Tanzania. Many of 
Tanzania’s unemployed youth have been enticed by drug lords into doubling as couriers and 
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 UNODC ‘Cannabis in Africa: An Overview’ available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Can_Afr_EN_09_11_07.pdf (accessed 28 July 2013). 
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 ‘Bhang Farming in Forest on the Rise’ available at http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=49623 (accessed 28 
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swallowers of illicit narcotics pallets destined for other parts of Africa, Europe and Asia. Many 
of the couriers/mules have been arrested and prosecuted in various countries. Some are now 
languishing in jails and others have been executed. Anecdotal evidence shows that drug 
trafficking has greatly contributed to the growth of modern organised criminality in Tanzania. 
Today, the laundering of the proceeds from the illicit narcotics trade is one of the major forms 
of organised crime in Tanzania. In a bid to curb drug trafficking, Parliament has enacted the 
Drugs and Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Drugs Act.89 This law criminalises illicit dealings in drugs. 
It provides for the forfeiture of property derived from the illicit narcotics trade. It also 
implements the 1988 Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention, among other things, 
prohibits trade in narcotics90 and enjoins States Parties to confiscate the proceeds from the 
narcotics trade.91 In addition, the government has set up an anti-drug trafficking taskforce 
comprising of officers from the police and the intelligence.92 The government is now 
considering a bill that aims to provide a legal framework to give effect to what the anti-
narcotics taskforce needs to do.93  
2.4.2  Poaching and Illicit Trafficking in Endangered Wildlife 
Poaching and the illicit trade in wildlife is a very lucrative transnational criminal activity, second 
only to drug trafficking.94 This illegal trade involves trafficking in animal parts and endangered 
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animal species. Tanzania has 15 national parks which harbour the nation’s wildlife resources.95 
This natural endowment has attracted criminal gangs within and outside the country. Ivory 
poaching is the most prevalent form of poaching in Tanzania96and transnational criminal gangs 
have been killing about 20 elephants a month for their tusks.97 This has contributed even more 
to the dwindling population of elephants in Tanzania.98  More than 1 000 people were arrested 
for poaching between December 2012 and March 2013.99 It is believed that poaching and illicit 
trafficking of endangered wildlife in Tanzania is perpetrated by organised criminal syndicates in 
collusion with corrupt law enforcement officers.100 Just recently, two prison officers were 
arrested, together with others, for giraffe poaching. There are also some Tanzanians who have 
been arrested in the neighbouring Kenya, trying to export elephant tusks illegally from there.101 
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 http://www.tanzaniaparks.com/useful_documents.html# (accessed on 29 July 2013). 
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The fact of the matter is that there is a huge demand in China and other Asian markets for 
elephant tusks coming from Tanzania and the East African region.102 A Tanzanian media outlet 
has recently alluded to a report that implicates China in the illegal ivory trade in Tanzania.103 
International criminal syndicates profit hugely from the poaching. In response to the 
devastating effect the poaching has on the national economy, the Parliament of Tanzania has 
enacted the Wildlife Conservation Act.104 Tanzania is also a signatory to the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.105 This signifies the 
government’s commitment to international cooperation in fighting wildlife crimes. In addition, 
the US President, Barack Obama, recently issued an executive order that would, among other 
things, reinvigorate transnational cooperation in wildlife protection.106 This US-led international 
initiative for combating wildlife crimes is set to provide $ 10 million in aid to Tanzania and other 
countries.107 This would help strengthen Tanzania’s law enforcement capability.  
2.4.3 Corruption 
Corruption is a global problem that hampers economic development. In many parts of the 
world, it is hard to gain access to public social services without paying a bribe.108 Tanzania has 
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for years been grappling with the problem of both petty and grand corruption in the public 
sector.109 The most affected area of the public sector is the law enforcement sector. This 
includes the judiciary and the police. Just recently, the Minister for Home Affairs, Dr. Emmanuel 
Nchimbi, admitted in public that corruption is rampant in the police.110 Tanzania has been 
ranked number 102 out of 176 on the global corruption perception index.111 This shows that 
public sector corruption is widespread. In East Africa, Tanzania is second to Uganda as regards 
the incidence of bribery.112  
The Tanzanian Parliament has enacted laws and designated institutions to fight corruption. The 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act113 establishes the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB) to enforce anti-corruption measures.114 Tanzania has also ratified the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption115 and the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo Convention).116 The government’s commitment to 
eradicating corruption has resulted in senior politicians being charged for corruption. Since 
2008, two cabinet ministers have been facing prosecution for abuse of office which resulted in 
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a loss of revenue to the government in the amount of over Shillings 11.7 billion (US$ 7.3 
million).117 The case is, at the time of writing, still pending in court. In 2008, Tanzania’s Prime 
Minister, Edward Lowassa, resigned from office due to corruption over a contract in the energy 
sector.118 This led to the dissolution of the cabinet by the President.119 There are numerous 
prosecutions for corruption in progress involving senior government employees as well as mid-
level officials. However, corruption has continued to be one of the most prevalent forms of 
organised criminality in Tanzania. It has, for example, enabled criminals to deal freely in illicit 
drugs and to export elephant tusks illegally.  
2.4.4 Theft of Cars 
Theft of cars is another lucrative undertaking for organised criminal gangs in Tanzania. 
Sophisticated and well-connected criminal rackets have been operating at the international 
level from Tanzania. Car theft is one of the crimes that preoccupy organised criminal gangs in 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region.120 South Africa, the most 
affected country, is the main source of stolen cars, alongside Namibia and Zimbabwe. The 
stolen cars are transported by road to East African countries for sale. In 2001, Tanzanian police 
seized hundreds of vehicles which were stolen in South Africa.121  
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In recent years, a Tanzanian national, Mponjoli Malakasuka, was convicted in the UK of 
conspiracy to steal cars and export them to Tanzania for sale.122 He was the mastermind of a 
crime racket in the UK which targeted luxury cars for export. It has been reported that he 
successfully stole and exported cars worth US$ 2.5 million.123 In some incidents, he was hiring 
cars and exporting them. He would later tell a car hire company that the car had been stolen. 
When the police arrested him they found him with over thirty credit cards in fake identities and 
70 bank accounts, which he used to launder the profits. Just recently, the police impounded 22 
cars which had been stolen in South Africa, Japan, Malaysia and the UK.124 
2.4.5 Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling 
Human trafficking and smuggling of immigrants is a booming criminal endeavour in Tanzania 
and East Africa.125 A recent US report labels Tanzania as “a source, transit, and destination 
country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking”.126 
Internal trafficking is much higher than transnational trafficking. There is internal trafficking of 
young women for domestic servitude and sexual exploitation in urban centers. This iniquitous 
crime is committed by well-connected criminal rackets scattered all over the country. A 2009 
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report reveals that internal human trafficking for prostitution and domestic servitude is 
rampant in 8 regions namely Iringa, Morogoro, Dodoma, Manyara, Arusha, Singida, Tanga, and 
Dar es Salaam.127 The crime of smuggling immigrants is just as big a problem. Organised 
criminal gangs operating in Tanzania have been smuggling immigrants, mainly Somalis and 
Ethiopians, into Tanzania at a huge financial profit.128 In 2012, 10 000 illegal immigrants were 
arrested,129 but the problem persists to the present day.130 The smuggled immigrants hide in 
trucks carrying goods. In 2012, about 45 illegal immigrants died from suffocation in a truck in 
Dodoma, Tanzania, en route to Malawi.131 Despite the government’s enactment of the Anti-
Human Trafficking Act132 , the lack of means to implement it remains a worrying impediment to 
dealing with this menacing scourge effectively.133 
2.5 The Scale of Money Laundering in Tanzania 
There is no official information on how much money is laundered in Tanzania on an annual 
basis. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it runs into the billions. On 10 September 1999, British 
Aerospace Group (BAE), PLC won a tender to supply the Tanzanian government with radar 
defence system at a contract price of $ 39.97 million. The deal was honoured and the radar was 
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delivered to Tanzania. In 2004, the British Serious Fraud Office (SFO) ventured into an 
investigation of BAE PLC transactions across the world after it received allegations of corruption 
and bribery. The investigation concluded that the Tanzanian deal was soiled with corruption. In 
a plea bargain agreement between BAE and SFO, it was revealed that BAE paid a total of $ 12.4 
million to a Tanzanian marketing advisor, Shailesh Vithlani, for making Tanzanian officials more 
amenable to the deal.134 The payment involved four companies: BAE used the Red Diamond 
Trading Limited Company (incorporated in the British Virgin Islands) and BAE (Operations) LTD 
to channel the money to the Envers Trading Corporation (incorporated in Panama) and Merlin 
International Limited (incorporated in Tanzania), both companies controlled by Vithlani.135 For 
the settlement, BAE pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of failure to maintain adequate and 
accurate financial records regarding the payment made to Vithlani’s offshore companies.136 
In the case of Regina v BAE Systems PLC, BAE admitted to breaching Section 221 of the 
Companies Act 1985 by not providing accounting records with respect to the $ 12.4 million paid 
to Vithlani.137 The court alluded to an admission by BAE that such money could have been used 
by Vithlani to influence the negotiation process with the government of Tanzania in favour of 
BAE.138 In short, the court found BAE guilty under the law for failing to “keep accounting 
records sufficient to show and explain the payments, and identifying the matters in respect of 
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%20settlement%20agreement%20and%20basis%20of%20plea.pdf (accessed 31 July 2013). 
135
 Settlement Agreement between SFO and BAE Systems PLC, at paragraph 4.2 of page 2. 
136
 Settlement Agreement between SFO and BAE Systems PLC, at paragraphs 4.6 and 4.7 of page 2. 
137
 Judgment of the case available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/133543/bae%20opening%20statement%2020.12.10.pdf (accessed 31 July 2013). 
138
 Judgment at paragraph 24 and 25 of page 9. 
 
 
 
 
 34 
 
which the expenditure took place”.139 BAE was fined   500 000.140 Under the settlement 
agreement between SFO and BAE, BAE agreed to pay   30 million as compensation to the 
people of Tanzania.141 In 2012, BAE paid   29.5 million which, according to a memorandum of 
understanding between Tanzania, SFO, BAE, and the UK government, would be used for 
educational projects in Tanzania.142  
This is a classic case of grand corruption and money laundering. Unlawful money was paid to 
Tanzanian officials. This money has been, as we shall see, laundered through offshore banks 
and then integrated into the legal economy. The facilitator, Vithlani, had negotiated bribes with 
Tanzanian officials and made payments through wire transfers from a Swiss bank.143 Between 
June 1997 and April 1998, Andrew Chenge, Tanzania’s then Attorney-General, received money 
transfers worth US$ 1.5 million into a Barclays account number 59662999 in Jersey.144 The bank 
account was owned by Franton Investment Limited, an offshore company set up by Chenge in 
Jersey for the purpose of money laundering. In May 1998, Mr.Chenge transferred US$ 600 000 
to an account owned by Langley Investments Limited, an offshore company controlled by 
Dr.Idrissa Rashid who was the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania at the time.145 The laundering 
process was completed in September 1999 when Chenge authorised the transfer of US$ 1.2 
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million from the Franton account to the Royal Bank of Scotland in Jersey. The two Tanzanian 
officials, given their mandate under the law, were crucial for any contractual negotiations 
involving the government. The Attorney-General was responsible for the legal clearance, while 
the governor had a say in the financing aspects. Andrew Chenge, who held a ministerial position 
in 2008, resigned when investigations into BAE dealings implicated him.146 
This scenario sheds light on how widespread the problem of money laundering is in Tanzania. It 
points to a fact that organised crime has permeated government institutions in Tanzania. 
Furthermore, it supports an assertion that politically exposed persons have been using shell 
companies and offshore banks to clean dirty money emanating from corruption and other 
illegal undertakings. It is submitted that the UK justice system did not properly handle the radar 
scandal. The word ‘corruption’ was carefully avoided in the judgment. The British court wrongly 
stated that what BAE did amounted to lobbying, which was not the same as corruption.147 
Lobbying by paying kickbacks worth millions of dollars to covert marketing advisors? Perhaps 
the settlement agreement could help explain this conspiratorial conclusion of the BAE case by 
the British justice system. The settlement agreement concluded that “it was in the public 
interest that BAE should be prosecuted on this basis”.148 The basis of the plea agreement was 
that BAE should be prosecuted for improper and inadequate financial records and not 
corruption. The charge of corruption, if proved, could have dented BAE’s business prospects in 
Europe and the world at large. And this is a company that is so vital for British defence and 
commercial interests. The settlement agreement was meant to protect wider British interests. 
                                                     
146
 ‘Tanzanian Minister Quits over BAE Investigations’ available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/apr/22/defence.bae (accessed 31 July 2013). 
147
 Judgment, at paragraph 26 of page 9. 
148
 Settlement Agreement at paragraph 6.1 of page 3. 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
The case has been concluded and will never be reopened as there is a clause in the Settlement 
Agreement that says “there shall be no further investigation or prosecution of any member of 
the BAE Systems Group for any conduct preceding 5 February 2010”.149 This means that the 
Tanzanian officials will never be held to account for the bribes from BAE. Their money 
laundering endeavours in relation to the BAE dirty money have been condoned. The British 
court judgment has made Mr.Chenge to claim publicly that he is innocent.150 Theoretically, the 
Tanzanian authorities could still investigate the case and prosecute the culprits, but this will not 
happen as the PCCB has already cleared Chenge of any liability in the radar deal.151 This has 
aroused suspicion as there is a report by Wikileaks quoting the Director General of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau saying that the radar deal was dirty and senior 
government officials were implicated.152  
Another red flag for money laundering activities in Tanzania is a recent Swiss National Bank 
revelation that Tanzanians, mostly politicians and business people, have US$ 196.87 million 
stashed in various Swiss accounts.153 This issue has aroused public attention as people demand 
answers as to the legal provenance of the money. Hoarding of money in foreign accounts is a 
crime under Tanzanian law.154 The only logical conclusion with regard to the money would be 
that such money is the proceeds of crimes such as corruption and tax evasion. Owing to the 
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government’s reluctance to investigate, a Member of Parliament for Kigoma North has 
demanded a parliamentary probe into Tanzanians who have money in financial havens 
worldwide.155 Indeed, Parliament passed Resolution 9/2012, committing the government to 
investigate Tanzanians hiding money in offshore financial havens.156 Consequently, the 
government formed a probe team under the Chairmanship of the Attorney-General, Fredrick 
Werema.157 Results of the probe are yet to be tabled in Parliament.158 However, the probe may 
not yield any results, for tax havens are notorious for their stringent bank secrecy laws, which 
obstruct any investigations into the financial affairs of their banks’ customers. Furthermore, 
developing countries like Tanzania lack officials with the forensic skills who know how tax 
havens work. Attempts by the Tanzanian authorities to extract information from Switzerland 
have been qualified by the steep preconditions that Switzerland has set to complying with the 
requests. These are that: Tanzania should provide Swiss authorities with names of account 
holders and hard evidence on the illegal origin of the money kept in the bank accounts. 159 
These preconditions are almost impossible to meet, which effectively translates into non-
cooperation from the Swiss. It is doubtful, too, whether the World Bank or the G8 countries 
would encounter lesser impediments if asked by Tanzania to intervene. 
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2.6 Terrorism and Terrorist Financing in Tanzania 
Geographical location and geopolitical factors have made Tanzania an attractive country for 
terrorist activities. The country’s proximity to Somalia’s Al-Shabab is the prime terrorist threat 
of concern.160 On 7 October 2013, the Tanzanian police arrested eleven people who were 
conducting the Al-Shabab-style military drills in a forest in Mtwara region.161 The terrorist 
suspects were in possession of various traditional weapons and digital video discs on the Al-
Shabab training methods. The 1998 terrorist bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam has 
thus far been the only major terrorist attack in Tanzania.162 A Tanzanian national, Ahmed 
Khalfan Ghailani, was convicted of conspiring in the 1998 attacks on US establishments in Kenya 
and Tanzania.163 Ghailani received a life sentence for the attacks.164 He has since appealed the 
conviction.165 At the time of writing, a decision on his appeal has not yet been handed down. 
Despite the lack of terrorist attacks in Tanzania since 1998, several foreign nationals have been 
arrested for being wanted for terrorism charges abroad. In June 2012, Tanzanian security 
personnel arrested a German national of Turkish origin, Emrah Erdogan, for involvement in 
terrorist attacks.166 Likewise, in July 2013, Tanzanian security personnel arrested a British 
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terrorist suspect, Assan Ali Iqbal, as he was trying to flee to Malawi.167 These arrests indicate 
that terrorists have working networks in Tanzania and money, whether licit or illicit, is used for 
such operations.  
2.7 Conclusion 
Government efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism are hampered 
by the lack of information communication technology literacy, porous country borders, lack of 
financial resources, lack of skilled criminal justice personnel to deal with white collar criminality, 
corruption and a lethargic commitment to the Rule of Law.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROLE OF THE MUTUAL EVALUATION EXERCISE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL MEASURES AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF 
TERRORISM  
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter deals with implementation of international minimum standards for combating 
money laundering and terrorist financing. The mutual evaluation exercise is deemed as the best 
tool for achieving compliance with such standards. The chapter also provides an understanding 
of the mutual evaluation exercise and the role it plays in the implementation of FATF standards. 
Finally, it discusses the mutual evaluation of Tanzania by ESAAMLG and Tanzania’s subsequent 
response to the report.  
3.2 International Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Legal Framework 
Transnational organised crime needs to be combated by resorting to the international legal 
framework against illicit profits.168 No single state can assume this task alone. It is for this 
reason that the UN has adopted conventions specifically devised for curbing transnational 
crimes such as money laundering and terrorist financing. Likewise, inter-governmental 
organisations like the FATF have also developed international standards for preventing 
economic crimes.  
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3.2.1 International Anti-Money Laundering Law 
 Trade in narcotics reached unprecedented levels in the 1980s, prompting the international 
community, led by the US, to adopt countermeasures aimed at stopping the laundering of the 
proceeds from the illegal trade in narcotics.169 Against this background, the discussion below 
focuses on the international approaches to anti-money laundering and combating the financing 
of terrorism.  
Shaw argues that an authoritative description of the sources of international law is article 38(1) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),170 which lists the sources of internal law 
as ‘international conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations, judicial decisions and teachings of most highly qualified publicists’.171 Let us 
now look at the international law norms against money laundering emanating from 
conventions and other sources. 
(a) The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988 Vienna Convention).172 This convention calls for member states to: 
criminalise money laundering;173 adopt measures for identification, tracing, freezing or 
confiscation of proceeds of drug-related offences;174 designate drug-related offences 
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extraditable among them;175 and to afford one another mutual legal assistance in 
relation to crimes under the convention.176 The convention does not expressly mention 
the term money laundering, but the wording of Article 3 replicates traditional elements 
that constitute the crime of money laundering. 
(b) The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.177 It criminalises: 
participation in organised crime;178 laundering of criminal profits;179 corruption;180 and 
obstruction of justice.181 To prevent criminals from enjoying their ill-gotten gains, it 
provides for freezing or confiscation of proceeds of crime.182 The Convention enjoins 
States Parties to establish regulatory and supervisory measures for banks and non-
banking financial institutions in order to detect and prevent money laundering.183 States 
are also required to establish a financial intelligence organ for gathering, analysing and 
sharing information on money laundering activities.184 Monitoring cross-border 
movement of cash is another anti-money laundering requirement under the 
Convention.185 Unlike the 1988 Vienna Convention which is limited to drug-related 
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offences, the Palermo Convention widens the scope of predicate crimes186 for money 
laundering to include all serious crimes.187 Likewise, member states are enjoined to 
establish ‘the widest range of predicate offences’ for money laundering.188 To promote 
international cooperation in the fight against organised crime, the Convention provides 
for extradition189 and mutual legal assistance.190 
(c) The United Nations Convention against Corruption.191 This convention criminalises 
money laundering192 in the same manner as the Palermo Convention and enjoins 
signatories to apply criminalisation of money laundering to ‘the widest range of 
predicate offences’.193 Predicate offences for money laundering include those 
committed abroad subject to application of the principle of double criminality.194 
(d) The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (The European Convention 
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against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing).195 The convention criminalises the 
laundering of proceeds of crime196 within the confines of the Palermo Convention. The 
threshold requirement for predicate offences under the convention is reasonably 
wide.197 It includes serious offences under domestic laws. Predicate crimes also include 
conduct that occurred in another state subject to the principle of double criminality.198 
(e) The 40 Recommendations of the FATF. The problem of the illegal drug trade and money 
laundering propelled developed industrialised countries to establish the FATF for the 
purpose of combating money laundering.199 The FATF is an inter-governmental body 
whose mandate is to develop and promote policies for combating money laundering 
and terrorist financing.200 The FATF issued its first set of Recommendations in 1990. The 
Recommendations built upon the provisions of the 1988 Vienna Convention as well the 
Basel Statement of Principles, which set out the standards that banks should maintain in 
respect of combating money laundering201. Generally speaking, the 1990 
Recommendations aimed at preventing misuse of financial institutions by money 
launderers. However, the Recommendations applied only to banks and focused on drug 
trafficking as a predicate offence for money laundering.202 In 1996 the FATF revised its 
Recommendations to enlarge the scope of predicate offences beyond those involving 
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dealing in drugs.203 Similarly, the FATF Recommendations underwent a major overhaul 
in 2003 to keep abreast of new money laundering methods employed by criminals.204 
The 2003 Recommendations offer an approach to defining the scope of predicate crimes 
under three options: include all crimes; define predicates by categorisation of offences; 
or list specific crimes as predicates. They also introduce tighter reporting requirements 
as well as broadening the scope of professionals bound by anti-money laundering 
rules.205 The FATF Recommendations have been domesticated in many countries. 
Nevertheless, the Recommendations are soft law and, therefore, not binding on 
states.206 Being soft law, the Recommendations are significant in signalling the evolution 
and establishment of guidelines that could ultimately crystallise into binding norms 
under international law.207 It is only a matter of time for the FATF Recommendations to 
become binding under international law as there are some binding treaties which 
obligate member states to implement the Recommendations.208  
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3.2.2 International Anti-Terrorist Financing Law 
International efforts to combat terrorist financing intensified after the September 11 attacks on 
the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in the US.209 However, before 9/11, the UN had already 
passed a Resolution which, among other things, targeted the finances of the terrorist group, al 
Qaeda.210 International instruments for curbing terrorist financing are: 
(a) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Convention 
against Terrorist Financing).211 The Convention criminalises terrorist financing.212 
Liability for terrorist financing attaches not only to individuals but also organisations 
with a legal personality.213 It also provides for freezing and confiscation of terrorist 
finances as well as proceeds of terrorist activities.214 
(b) The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (SCR 1373).215 The Resolution 
requires states to: criminalise financing of terrorism;216 freeze financial resources of 
terrorists and their organisations including their supporters;217 prohibit donation of 
funds to terrorists;218 prosecute individuals who participate in terrorist financing and 
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perpetration of terrorist acts;219 and to cooperate with one another in criminal matters 
involving terrorist acts and terrorist financing.220 Furthermore, the Resolution calls upon 
states to ratify the Convention against Terrorist Financing.221 To ensure compliance with 
the Resolution, a special committee of the Security Council has been established to 
monitor implementation of the resolution by states.222 Security Council Resolution (SCR) 
1373 constitutes a decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter223 and is therefore 
binding on all members of the UN.224 It declares international terrorism a threat to 
international peace and security and imposes collective binding measures on all states 
for suppressing terrorist financing. The relevant part of the Resolution on counter 
terrorist financing is not an invention of the Security Council but builds upon the 
Convention against Terrorist Financing. 
(c) The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. It criminalises terrorist financing 
by making a reference to the Convention against Terrorist Financing.225 Signatories are 
also required to institute measures for identification, freezing, and confiscation of 
property, whether legitimate or illegitimate, used for financing terrorism.226 
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(d) FATF IX Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.227 The Recommendations call 
for states to: ratify the Convention against Terrorist Financing and implement SCR 
1373;228 Criminalise terrorism and the financing of terrorism;229 and freeze and 
confiscate terrorist assets.230  
Having discussed international law for AML/CFT, let us now see the role of the FATF in 
enforcing implementation of such standards. 
3.3 The FATF and Implementation of International Standards against Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing 
As pointed out earlier, recommendations of the FATF are not binding. However, the FATF has all 
along been working towards achieving universal participation in implementation of its 
standards for AML/CFT. One scholar opines that lack of universal implementation would create 
enforcement dissimilarities which would make criminals gravitate towards jurisdictions with 
weaker laws.231 Using strict implementation monitoring mechanisms and peer pressure on non-
compliant countries, the FATF has been able to influence countries to implement its 
recommendations.232 
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The mutual evaluation exercise is the primary mechanism for securing implementation of FATF 
standards by States.233 This is just a review exercise conducted for the purpose of ascertaining a 
country’s compatibility with international standards. It is done according to a standard 
methodology published by the FATF.234 The review exercise is completed with publication of a 
report containing findings and recommendations. An evaluated country must come up with a 
strategy for dispelling weaknesses identified in the report. Normally, there is peer pressure 
from other countries exerted on an evaluated country to comply with the standards. A 
jurisdiction that fails to effectively implement FATF recommendations would be blacklisted and 
even subjected to sanctions.235 This has worked well in forcing countries, especially developing 
ones, to implement the recommendations. However, the FATF only conducts mutual evaluation 
of its members. It therefore requires FATF-Styled Regional Bodies (FSRBS) such as ESAAMLG to 
conduct mutual evaluations of its members.236 At this juncture, let us look at the ESAAMLG 
mutual evaluation of Tanzania. 
3.4  Mutual Evaluation of Tanzania 
The Mutual evaluation of Tanzania was conducted by the ESAAMLG in 2009. A report was 
published in the same year, detailing anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
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terrorism measures.237 It also provides recommendations on how to strengthen the AML/CFT 
system in Tanzania. Some of the shortcomings of the AML/CFT system in Tanzania that were 
identified in the report included: 
 Non-regulation of the real estate business; 
 Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions were not monitored for 
implementing AML/CFT measures; 
 Non-regulation of internet casinos; 
 There was no law for registration of trusts; 
 Prosecution of money laundering was dependent upon conviction for a predicate crime; 
 The list of predicate crimes excluded serious crimes under the FATF definition; 
 The AML Act was ambiguous as to what a corrupt practice was; 
 The definition of terrorist financing under the AML Act did not reflect offences under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA); 
 The AML Act was unclear as to whether self-laundering was prosecutable; 
 The AML Act did not allow parallel criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings; 
 The law did not allow prosecution of foreigners for offences committed abroad;  
 The POTA did not define the term ‘funds’; 
 There was no civil forfeiture regime in Tanzania; 
 There was no mechanism for freezing terrorist assets as provided under the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373; 
 The law did not provide for security of tenure of the Commissioner of the FIU; 
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 The FIU was not legally empowered to seek information from other stakeholders; 
 There was no legal framework for regulating trans-border movement of cash; 
 The law excluded vital reporting persons like pension funds executives; 
 There was non-implementation of AML/CFT requirements by insurance brokers; 
 The law did not obligate reporting persons to identify the beneficial owner of property; 
 Enhanced due diligence was not covered under the law; 
 Some money exchange service providers did not undertake customer due diligence 
(CDD); 
 The law regulating financial institutions did not allow sharing of CDD data amongst 
banks; 
 The definition of terrorist financing did not conform to the FATF special 
recommendation IV; 
 Immunity for reporting persons did not extend to all, excluding other entities like 
bureau de change; 
 The FIU was understaffed and its officials lacked the expertise to deal with money 
laundering and terrorist financing; 
 The law did not expressly prevent domestic banks from dealing with shell banks; 
 Money transfer services by mobile phone operators were not subject to AML/CFT 
requirements; 
 The law permitted the use of nominee directors leading to obscurity of beneficial 
ownership; 
 The NGOs sector was not monitored for implementing AML/CFT measures; 
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 The National Anti-Money Laundering Committee did not deal with terrorist financing; 
 There were no measures for detection and monitoring cross border transportation of 
cash; 
 Tanzania lacked a law for protection of witnesses and victims; 
 There was no asset forfeiture fund for custody of confiscated property; and 
 The extradition law did cover terrorist financing offences. 
Some of the deficiencies had to do with implementation while others focussed on gaps in the 
laws of Tanzania. How has Tanzania responded? 
3.5 Tanzania’s Response to the Mutual Evaluation Report 
Once a Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) has been adopted by the ESAAMLG Council of 
Ministers238 and published,239 the evaluated country must come up with an implementation 
plan, identifying actions to be taken to address deficiencies identified in the MER so as to 
comply with international AML/CFT standard.240 Failure to do so could result in suspension or 
expulsion from the ESAAMLG.241 In compliance with the ESAAMLG Memorandum of 
Understanding and Mutual Evaluation Procedures, in 2010, Tanzania introduced an AML/CFT 
strategy as a direct response to the MER.242 The strategy deals with five areas namely legal, law 
enforcement, financial sector, governance and regional and international cooperation.243 A key 
objective for the legal sector is implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act and the 
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Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).244 The overriding objective here is to implement such laws 
in conformity with the FATF Recommendations. The strategy has set out nineteen areas for this 
objective. Some of the areas include: 
 Ratification of all international conventions on AML/CFT; 
 Amending laws for compliance with international standards and recommendations of 
the mutual evaluation report; 
 Issuing regulations for implementing POTA and AML Act; 
 Designating regulators for DNFBPs; and 
 Enforcing implementation of AML/CFT measures by NGOs. 
Most of these action plans have not been implemented. For example, nothing has been done 
with regard to implementation of AML/CFT measures by NGOs. Most of the non-financial 
businesses and professions such as lawyers, casinos, dealers in precious metals and stones, 
trusts and real estate agents have no regulators and this means non-implementation of FATF 
standards. However, the government has already issued regulations for the POTA.245 Likewise, 
there are new regulations in place for AML.246  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR AML/CFT IN TANZANIA 
4.1 Anti-Money Laundering Legal Framework 
The principal legislation for combating money laundering in Tanzania is the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act of 2006. In response to the MER, the law was amended in 2012. The section 
bellow discusses its salient features. 
4.1.1 Criminalisation 
The law criminalises money laundering in conformity with the Palermo Convention and the 
1988 Vienna Convention.247 Criminal liability attaches to both natural and juridical persons.248 It 
also provides for lesser modes of commission of money laundering such as conspiracy, aiding, 
and abetting.249 The law lists 29 crimes as predicate crimes.250 It is submitted that the scope of 
predicate crimes needs to be widened to cover “all unlawful activities” so as to catch all illegal 
undertakings which would give rise to proceeds that need laundering.251 Most countries 
including the UK and South Africa have an “all crimes” approach. The mens rea, which is the 
mental element requirement, for money laundering exists when a person knowingly deals with 
a property that is the proceeds of crime.252 At the time of writing, this provision has not been 
interpreted by the Tanzanian courts. However, the MER has interpreted the mens rea threshold 
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under Section 12 to mean that prosecution for money laundering is dependent on conviction 
for a predicate offence.253 This interpretation is flawed as the law only requires evidence to 
show that the defendant knew of the illegal provenance of the property in question and not 
proof of the predicate crime. In some common law jurisdictions, provisions akin to Section 12 
have been interpreted to mean that proof of the predicate crime is not required. The 
Prosecution is only required to prove that the defendant knew of the illegal origin of the 
property in question. In the case of R v Allison [2006] 1 NZLR 721, the Court of Appeal of New 
Zealand stated that proof of a predicate crime was not required.254 The Privy Council reached 
the same finding in the case of The DPP v Bholah [2011] UKPC 44.255 These decisions do not 
bind the Tanzanian courts but are of persuasive precedential value. They could be used by 
Tanzanian courts to interpret Section 12. However, one good solution is to introduce an explicit 
provision in the law to say that proof of a predicate crime is not necessary.256 This would work 
well if an “all crimes” regime exists. This would afford the prosecution with the freedom to 
prosecute either for the predicate crime or for money laundering.    
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4.1.2 Universal Jurisdiction 
The law vests the High Court with jurisdiction to try foreigners for money laundering offences 
committed outside Tanzania subject to double criminality.257 Such a trial could only take place 
where the Director of Public Prosecution consents258 and extradition to the territorial state is 
impossible.259 
4.1.3 Prevention of Money Laundering 
The law requires reporting persons260 to undertake Customer Due Diligence (CDD) in order to 
establish the true identity of persons or entities with whom they wish to conduct business.261 
This includes establishing the identity of beneficial owners.262 They are also obligated to keep 
records of all transactions263 for a minimum period of 10 years.264 In addition, the reporting 
persons are required to report suspicious transactions to the FIU.265 The law provides for 
administrative or criminal sanctions against reporting persons for failure to comply with their 
AML obligations.266 Critical to prevention measures is the absence of a requirement for 
enhanced CDD except for politically exposed persons (PEP).267 The law also leaves out crucial 
reporting persons such as the Tanzanian Revenue Authority, the Tanzanian Immigration Service, 
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mobile phone operators, dealers in motor vehicles, NGOs and religious institutions. Lastly, the 
law does not penalise malicious reporting of suspicious transactions.268 
4.1.4 The Financial Intelligence Unit 
 The law establishes the FIU as a department in the Ministry of Finance.269 The FIU is mandated 
to receive, analyse, and disseminate to law enforcers suspicious transaction reports (STRs), 
currency transaction reports, cross border currency reports and electronic funds transfer 
reports.270 The FIU is vested with powers to demand or access information from the reporting 
persons and regulators.271 The FIU is headed by a Commissioner appointed by the President.272 
The Commissioner is the Chief Executive Officer of the FIU273 and his security of tenure is 
guaranteed under the law.274 The law grants immunity to all employees of the FIU against 
prosecution.275 Most criticism is directed at the fact that the FIU lacks independence. The law 
says that the FIU has “operational and budgetary independence”.276 Practically, it could be 
impossible for the FIU to operate independently as it is a ministerial department. This could 
breed political interference in the discharge of its duties. Most African countries have 
established their FIUs as independent organs.277 Another limitation to an effective FIU is lack of 
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sufficient financial and human resources. The FIU receives meagre finances from the 
government, making it unable to discharge its functions effectively.278  
4.1.5 The National Multidisciplinary Committee 
The AML Act establishes the National Multidisciplinary Committee on AML.279 The committee is 
charged with formulating and assessing the effectiveness of policies and measures for curbing 
money laundering and terrorist financing.280 It is also responsible for advising the government 
on legislative and policy reforms in relation to AML and CFT.281 A shortcoming here is the 
composition of the committee as constituted under the law,282 for it leaves out representatives 
from the private sector and crucial public institutions such as the National Prosecution Service, 
the Tanzanian Revenue Authority, the Tanzanian Immigration Service, and the Tanzanian 
Investment Centre. These institutions are very critical in the enforcement of AML/CFT 
measures.  
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4.1.6 Reporting Requirements and Secrecy Obligations 
The law permits reporting persons to dispense with secrecy obligations under written laws for 
the purpose of fulfilling AML/CFT requirements.283 Banks can now divulge customer 
information to the FIU.284 Furthermore, all reporting persons are immune to any legal action for 
breach of “banking or professional secrecy or contract” in relation to reports submitted in good 
faith to the FIU.285 This immunity also applies to lawyers (advocates) as reporting persons under 
the law.286 However, the law does not define the applicability and limitation of the common law 
right to legal professional privilege in relation to reporting obligations for lawyers.287 The 
doctrine of legal professional privilege is a substantive right288 that guards against disclosure of 
lawyer-client communications pertaining to legal advice or litigation.289 Such communications 
are regarded as privileged and therefore not amenable to disclosure to third parties. However, 
criminal communications are not privileged as such. This right is applicable to Tanzania as a 
common law country. It is also recognised under the law of evidence.290 As the AML Act 
provides, lawyers as reporting persons could be required to supply such privileged 
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communications. This is an unwarranted attack on the age-old common law principle that 
protects and upholds the right of access to justice. There is need for the law to clarify lawyer’s 
reporting requirements in relation to the principle of legal professional privilege. South Africa is 
an example on this issue. Section 37 (1) of the Financial Intelligence Act (FICA)291 dispenses with 
secrecy rules applicable to the accountable institutions for the purpose of reporting suspicious 
transactions. Section 37 (1) is substantively similar to section 21 (1) of the AML Act. 
Nevertheless, South Africa’s FICA clearly states that section 37 (1) does not apply to the 
common law right to legal professional privilege between attorney-client communications 
pertaining to pending litigation, contemplated litigation or existing litigation.292 The same 
approach has been taken by Kenya293 and Australia.294 However, the Kenyan law permits 
lodging an application with the High Court for an order of disclosure of lawyer-client 
communications by an Advocate for the purpose of investigation on money laundering.295 
However, an Advocate is not compelled to comply with a court order if it amounts to breaching 
the principle of legal professional privilege.296     
                                                     
291
 Act No.38 of 2001. Available at https://www.fic.gov.za/DownloadContent/LEGISLATION/ACTS/01.a38-01b.pdf 
(accessed 5 September 2013). 
292
 Section 37 (2) FICA; Hamman AJ and Koen R ‘Cave Pecuniam: Lawyers as Launderers’ (2012) 15 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 78.  
293
 Section 18 (1) and (2) of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
294
 Section 242 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act of 2006 states that “law 
relating to legal professional privilege no affected”. Available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00371/Html/Text#_Toc362266786 (accessed 5 September 2013). 
295
 Section 18 (3).  
296
 Section 18 (4) of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
4.1.7 Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime 
The law on the confiscation of the proceeds of money laundering is governed by the Proceeds 
of Crime Act (POCA).297 The POCA allows for confiscation of tainted property.298 For the purpose 
of enforcing AML measures, the term “property” has been redefined to include title deeds and 
negotiable instruments.299 The law also permits confiscation of property of an accused person 
who dies during the investigations or before conclusion of the trial.300 The law safeguards the 
rights of bona fide thirds parties with respect to confiscation of tainted property.301 The Police 
are permitted to freeze a bank account for seven days and seize bank documents upon 
reasonable suspicion that the account holder is involved in money laundering.302 Leave of the 
court must be obtained for continued seizure after the seven days. By the same token, the 
Police have been given extensive powers to investigate a bank account and demand production 
of account details for the purpose of money laundering investigations.303 In addition, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions is empowered to obtain a court order directing a bank to 
provide the Inspector General of Police with transaction records of a certain account.304 With 
                                                     
297
 Section 28 AML Act. 
298
 Section 14 and 25 POCA, Act No.25 of 1991. Available at http://www.fiu.go.tz/POCA.pdf (accessed 5 September 
2013). 
299
 Section 3 of POCA as amended by section 16 (b) of Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No.6 of 
2012. 
300
 Section 13B of POCA as amended by section 19 of Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No.6 of 2012. 
301
 Section 16 of POCA allows a person having an interest in property against which a forfeiture order has been 
made to apply to the court for protecting his property rights. The court may grant the application upon being 
satisfied that the applicant did not perpetrate the crime or wittingly involved in the acquisition of criminal profits. 
Article 12(8) under the Palermo Convention and Article 5(8) under the 1988 Vienna Convention requires protection 
of property rights of third parties during confiscation.  
302
 Section 31A of POCA as amended by section 11 of Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No.15 of 
2007.  
303
 Section 63A of POCA as amended by section 11 of Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No.15 of 
2007. This is in line with Recommendation 31 of the FATF Recommendations. 
304
 Section 65 POCA. This is in line with the ambit of Articles 5(3) and 12(6) of the 1988 Vienna Convention and the 
Palermo Convention respectively. 
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regard to extraterritorial confiscation, the law permits the enforcement of foreign confiscation 
orders against property held in Tanzania.305 Tanzania’s asset forfeiture regime has its flaws.  
One shortcoming is the lack of a non-conviction recovery procedure that targets tainted 
property as opposed to criminals.306 The FATF advocates the use of civil recovery.307 Today, 
most countries use civil recovery alongside criminal forfeiture to target proceeds of crime. Civil 
forfeiture has become an essential tool in fighting organised crime as it is increasingly becoming 
difficult to bring leaders of organised crime groups to justice. This view was upheld by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v 
Mohamed NO and Others (CCT13/02) [2002] ZACC 9.308 Another shortcoming is the absence of 
a confiscation procedure for dealing with proceeds of crime that have been intermingled with 
property from lawful sources. In this scenario, the Palermo Convention provides that such 
intermingled property would be liable to confiscation only to the extent of the assessed value 
of the proceeds of crime.309 It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the criminal forfeiture 
regime in taming money laundering in Tanzania as there are no official statistics. However, 
anecdotal evidence shows that criminal forfeiture has not been fully utilised to tame organised 
crime in Tanzania. Identification and tracking of assets liable to confiscation has been hampered 
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 Section 18 POCA and Section 32 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACM Act) No. 24 of 1991, 
available at http://www.fiu.go.tz/MutualAssistanceInCriminalMattersAct.pdf (accessed 10 September 2013). 
Article 13 of the Palermo Convention enjoins States to enact laws for facilitating international cooperation on 
confiscation of proceeds of crime.  
306
 Young SNM (Ed) Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property: Legal Measures for Targeting the Proceeds of Crime (2009) 
13. 
307
 Recommendation 4. 
308
 Judgment at page 11. Available at http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZACC/2002/9.pdf (accessed 5 September 
2013). 
309
 Article 12(4); Article 5(6) (b) of the 1988 Vienna Convention and Article 31(5) of UNCAC. 
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by limited capacity to investigate white-collar organised crime, corruption and lack of financial 
resources. 
4.2 Counter-Terrorist Financing Legal Framework 
4.2.1 Criminalisation 
The POTA criminalises the provision of funds310 or property311 for the purpose of carrying out 
terrorist acts.312 Acts of terrorism and terrorist financing are predicate crimes for money 
laundering.313 The law also criminalises dealing in property owned by a terrorist group.314 
4.2.2  Universal Jurisdiction 
The High Court is vested with jurisdiction to try foreigners for terrorist financing committed 
abroad subject to the principle of dual criminality and non-extradition of the offender to the 
State of commission.315 
4.2.3 Prevention of Terrorist Financing 
Information gathering is a primary tool for detection and prevention of terrorist financing under 
the POTA. The public has a duty to disclose information to the police and the FIU that may help 
counter acts of terrorism or bring potential suspects to book.316 Bona fide informants are 
immune to prosecution.317 Similarly, the public and financial institutions have a duty to disclose 
                                                     
310
 Section 14. The term “funds” is broadly defined under Section 24 of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act No.6 of 2012 to include assets of all kinds and negotiable instruments. 
311
 Section 15. 
312
 The list of terrorist acts is provided for under Section 4. 
313
 Definition of “predicate offence” under Section 3 of the AML Act. 
314
 Section 17. 
315
 Section 34(6) POTA. This is a requirement under Article 7(4) of the Convention against Terrorist Financing. 
316
 Section 40 POTA and Regulation 4(a) of the POTA Regulations of 2012 (POTA Regulations).  
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information pertaining to property either owned by a terrorist group or being used to 
perpetrate terrorism.318 Accountable entities319 are obligated to report transactions with no 
apparent lawful purpose.320 In doing so, they are not bound by secrecy obligations.321 Unlike 
the AML as discussed above, the reporting obligation for lawyers under the POTA does not 
affect the common law right to legal professional privilege.322 Business people are also required 
to report to the police and the FIU if they hold property linked to terrorist financing or when 
they conduct a transaction that facilitates terrorist financing.323 The police are empowered to 
order an accountable entity to cease transactions involved or suspected to be involved in 
terrorist financing.324 A flaw here is that the law does not prescribe time limit for such an 
order.325 Another prevention tool is the power of the Minister for Home Affairs to declare 
persons and groups suspected international terrorists and international terrorist groups 
respectively.326 A person declared a terrorist is not allowed to enter Tanzania.327 The Tanzanian 
Immigration Service keeps a list of persons who have been declared international terrorists so 
as to make sure that they do not enter Tanzania. However, due to the problem of bureaucratic 
corruption and porous country borders, there is still a possibility for such terrorists to enter 
                                                     
318
 Section 41 POTA and Regulation 4(b) of the POTA Regulations. 
319
 List provided under Part II of the Schedule to the POTA. The list of accountable entities does not include 
important organisations such as charities and religious entities. In the past, charities and religious entities have 
been abused as conduits of finances for terrorist operations.  
320
 Regulation 5(1) of the POTA Regulations. 
321
 Regulation 9(1) of the POTA Regulations. 
322
 Regulation 9(2) of the POTA Regulations clearly states that a reporting duty for lawyers does not apply to legal 
professional privilege with respect to legal advice or litigation and communications between a lawyer and a third 
party with respect to litigation.  
323
 Regulation 6 of the POTA Regulations. 
324
 Regulation 8 of the POTA Regulations. 
325
 All it says is “for such a period as may be determined in the order” to enable the Police to carry out 
investigations or advise the Minister on what to do. This is a loophole that could be abused by the Police to harm 
legitimate business operations and property rights of people. There is need for setting a time limit for such orders 
or make them amenable to scrutiny by the courts.  
326
 Regulation 11 of the POTA Regulations. 
327
 Regulation 18 of the POTA Regulations. 
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Tanzania undetected. The accountable entities could be ordered to suspend transactions with 
such persons or groups.328 The Minister can also proscribe an organisation if it promotes or 
participates in acts of terrorism.329 The decision of the Minister to label people and groups as 
terrorists could be challenged in court.330 The court can revoke a ministerial declaration if it is 
satisfied, on preponderance of evidence, that it was unreasonable.331 However, the law is silent 
on the right of appeal in the event the court refuses to revoke the declaration.332     
4.2.4 Seizure, Freezing and Confiscation of Terrorist Assets 
The Police are empowered to seize property involved or suspected to be involved in the 
commission of terrorism.333 The accountable entities are obligated to freeze assets of persons 
or groups that have been declared terrorists.334 By the same token, the law permits conviction-
based confiscation.335 The rights of third parties with regard to forfeited property are 
safeguarded.336 Interestingly, the law permits confiscation without conviction with respect to 
property that is either owned by a terrorist group or has been or will be used to commit a 
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 Section 12 and Regulation 15 of the POTA Regulations. 
329
 Regulation 12 of the POTA Regulations. 
330
 Regulation 23(1) of the POTA Regulations. 
331
 Regulations 23(2) and 25(a) of the POTA Regulations. 
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 A clarification on the right of appeal is necessary since the High Court is generally not a court of last resort in 
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 Section 33 POTA. 
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 Regulation 17 of the POTA Regulations. 
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terrorist act.337 One shortcoming of the POTA is the non-provision of a mechanism for using 
forfeited assets to compensate victims of terrorism as required under international law.338 
4.3 General Shortcomings of Tanzania’s AML/CFT System 
1) There is no comprehensive law for witness protection. International law requires states 
to adopt measures for protection of witnesses from retaliation or intimidation.339 There 
are laws with patchy provisions for witness protection that fall short of the standard 
envisaged under international law.340 
2) The AML/CFT laws do not deal with cyber money laundering and terrorist financing. The 
FATF requires countries to assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing 
risks that may stem from “new technologies” as regards new payment products and 
new business practices.341 
3) There is no regulation of informal money transfer operations. The FATF recommends 
that all persons and entities dealing in money or value transfer business be licensed and 
subjected to supervision for compliance with AML/CFT requirements.342  
                                                     
337
 Section 43 POTA. This is awkward as the AML Act does not permit civil recovery with respect to property owned 
by suspected money launders.  
338
 Article 8(4) of the Convention against Terrorist Financing requires States to establish a mechanism for utilizing 
confiscated funds to compensate victims. 
339
 Article 24(1) of the Palermo Convention. 
340
 For example, Section 53 of the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act requires the Police to provide 
security to witnesses but it does not define the kind and scope of such security. Likewise, Section 22(2) of the AML 
Act empowers the Attorney General to apply to the court for an order for witness protection. However, the said 
provision is not mandatory as it gives discretion to the Attorney-General to decide whether to apply to the court or 
not. By way of analogy, South Africa’s Witness Protection Act No.112 of 1998 is comprehensive and permits 
witnesses themselves to apply for protection. 
341
 Recommendation 15. 
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 Recommendation 14. 
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4) There is no legislative limit for cash payments.343 This provides a benign environment for 
criminals to launder money outside the formal financial sector by buying high value 
assets with cash. 
5) There is no criminalisation of structuring and the use of smurfs.344 In other words, the 
law does not prohibit the practice of breaking money into smaller amounts and the use 
of different people (smurfs) to deposit such money into various accounts at different 
banks for the purpose of avoiding an AML/CFT reporting threshold of suspicious 
transactions by the banks. 
6) The real estate sector is not regulated. In other words, there is no law that specifically 
regulates dealers in buying and selling real property.345 This is a grave omission as there 
are companies and agents dealing in real estate but they are not subject to any 
regulatory regime especially to make sure that such transactions are not used to 
facilitate money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Today, it is possible to 
purchase land or a house in Tanzania worth millions of shillings without involving the 
banks. The risk for money laundering through the real estate sector is much higher in a 
cash-based economy like Tanzania. Strangely, real estate agents are “reporting persons” 
under the AML Act but the law does not designate a regulatory body to ensure that they 
comply with AML/CFT obligations. Furthermore, real estate agents are not licensed. 
There is an urgent need for the Tanzanian Parliament to enact a law for regulating the 
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 For example, Mauritius limits cash payment under Section 5 of the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money 
Laundering Act. 
344
 For example, Section 31 of Ghana’s AML Act and Section 64 of South Africa’s FICA criminalize structuring.  
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real estate sector,346 for it poses serious challenges in the fight against money 
laundering and terrorist financing.  
7) The AML Act does protect informants who are not “reporting persons” against legal 
action.347 
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 For example, Canada enacted the Real Estate Trading Act to make sure that real estate agents are licenced and 
operate lawfully. 
347
 Section 22(1) of the AML Act as amended does not protect “other members of the public” against prosecution 
for reporting information to the FIU. This weakness needs to be removed. Section 38 of South Africa’s FICA 
protects not only reporting persons but also “any other person”.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study reveals that Tanzania has taken great strides in implementation of international 
AML/CFT standards. The mutual evaluation exercise impelled the government to come up with 
a strategy for better implementation of the standards. Despite such efforts, there are various 
legislative and enforcement shortcomings which hamper the fight against money laundering 
and terrorist financing. The previous chapter has described legal challenges for an effective 
AML/CFT system. However trivial such weaknesses are, they have the potential to benefit 
criminals. They need to be removed immediately.  
There are a number of implementation issues that need to be dealt with. The FIU is the 
principal organ that has been charged with supervising the implementation of AML/CFT 
standards in Tanzania. Among other things, the FIU suffers from lack of autonomy as well as 
limited human and financial resources. Anecdotal information indicates that it has not been 
able to discharge its mandate effectively due to such constraints. The government has issued 
AML/CFT regulations that should be implemented by various regulators. It has been difficult to 
gauge the extent of implementation of the regulations due to a dire scarcity of statistics. The 
FIU is obligated to “maintain comprehensive statistics”348 that would inform on money 
laundering and terrorist financing trends for the purpose of enabling an effective 
implementation of the standards. However, to date, the FIU has not published any useful 
information on money laundering and terrorist financing.349 Its website only contains laws, 
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regulations and reports such as MER. In addition, the FIU has not conducted any scientific study 
on the problem of money laundering and terrorist financing in Tanzania. It is therefore difficult 
to employ the risk-based approach to combating money laundering and terrorist financing as 
required by the FATF. That countries need to identify, study and understand their money 
laundering and terrorist financing risks so that they direct their scarce resources towards areas 
with higher risks. As of now, this would not be possible in Tanzania due to lack of scientific 
typologies on money laundering and terrorist financing. 
Despite the lack of official statistics, anecdotal information reveals that DNFBPs such as 
lawyers, real estate agents, and accountants, to name a few, have not been fulfilling their 
AML/CFT reporting obligations.350 The FIU is largely dealing with financial institutions for 
enforcement of AML/CFT measures. This is a grave enforcement deficit as lawyers, accountants 
and real estate agents are known for facilitating money laundering schemes. Tanzania needs to 
adopt a robust supervisory mechanism for specific DNFBPs to make sure they implement 
AML/CFT measures. There is also a need to designate special regulators for DNFBs such as 
lawyers and real estate agents. 
Another implementation challenge is the lack of resources. The government has not directed a 
significant portion of its resources towards the fight against organised crime. This negatively 
affects enforcement actions envisaged in the National Strategy for AML/CFT. For example, the 
government intends to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement organs through the 
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 This goes against Recommendation 28 of the FATF Recommendations which requires countries to regulate and 
supervise DNFBPs for compliance with AML/CFT measures.  
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provision of modern tools for investigation and monitoring of borders.351 This has not been 
done and the usual excuse is the lack of financial resources. As a result, the police do not have 
state-of-the-art tools to curb the increasingly sophisticated organised crime gangs.352 By the 
same token, their inability to investigate white-collar organised crime derails the use of POCA to 
target criminal assets. They are unable to properly identify and track criminal assets for freezing 
or confiscation as required by the FATF.353 In view of the recent terrorist attacks on the 
Westgate shopping mall in Kenya, there is a need to step up border security.354 Therefore, for a 
successful AML/CFT regime, Tanzania needs to remove all legislative gaps and enhance 
enforcement of AML/CFT measures across all sectors. In addition, investigation authorities 
should be provided with more resources as well as training on how to go about investigating 
organised crime.  
 
 
 
 
Word Count: 18972. 
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 National AML/CFT Strategy 24. 
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 Recommendation 31 of the FATF Recommendations requires countries to ensure that their investigation 
authorities use top rate investigative techniques capable of exposing tricky money laundering and terrorist 
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